~ OPERATION HUSKY ~
SICILY - 9/10 JULY 1943
Operation Husky - the Invasion of Sicily was
the start of the Allies assault on German occupied Europe. Churchill described
Sicily and Italy as the soft underbelly of Europe but there were many hard
fought battles before the job was done.
With the successful North Africa Torch landings behind them and the gradual
clearance of Axis forces from Tunisia underway the resources were becoming available to undertake a series of amphibious landings in the
Mediterranean. The ambitious "Round Up" (Normandy) was still not feasible so the objective of the next phase in the conduct of the
war was to tie down Axis forces thus relieving pressure on the Eastern (Russian) front, and to force Italy out of the war. This was agreed at the
Casablanca conference of January 1943 although for a while the Americans were inclined towards increasing pressure in the Pacific and later
attacking Germany directly. In the end it was agreed to plan for a large scale assault via the periphery of Europe, or as Churchill preferred to call it "the soft underbelly of
Europe" - initially Sicily.
General Guzzoni had 12 divisions - two German and 10 Italian to defend the island; five of
the latter were infantry and five immobile coastal defence divisions. The garrison was 350,000 strong but included only 35,000 Germans and even
they were not fully mobilised. Beach defences, including pillboxes and barbed wire, were less formidable than those encountered in Normandy the
following year and modern tanks were relatively few in number. However the rugged rolling country favoured the defenders.
The Allied Commander was General Eisenhower supported by Admiral Cunningham the Sea Forces
Commander. General Alexander was Land Forces Commander and Air Marshal Tedder was Air Forces Commander.
Plans & Preparations
The original Allied plan was to launch two widely separate landings in the north-west and south east of the
island. General Montgomery objected on the grounds that this approach violated the principle of a combined and closely coordinated force. The
plan was changed with the British 8th Army landing on the south east of the island and the US 7th Army landing on the south.
There were 2,760 ships and major landing craft converging on their rendezvous near Malta. They were from
the River Clyde in Scotland, from Norfolk and Virginia in the USA and from ports from Beirut to Algiers in the Mediterranean. Seven and a half
Divisions and all their equipment were at sea and eager for action.
The operation was the most meticulously planned to date and benefited from the experience gained at Dieppe
(Jubilee), North Africa (Torch) and other raids and landings. However the Commanders in Chief, notably Cunningham and Tedder, failed to set up a
joint HQ to co-ordinate all land, sea and air elements and to provide all the advantages of speedy and effective communications that such an
arrangement would bestow. There might well
have been a price to pay had any unexpected event arisen that required a swift response at this high level. In the event the operation went well
despite senior officers being scattered around the Mediterranean from Malta to Bizerta.
and Mountbatten were in Malta when they heard a BBC announcer tell the world that Allied forces had landed in Sicily. This was the first definite
news they received of the landing!
The disposition of the forces was as follows;
Farther to the west and round the corner of the island was Rear Admiral Sir Philip Vian's
Force V and the 1st Canadian Division, both under Leeses's 30 Corps. All three Rear Admirals came under the command of
Ramsay who was on the Antwerp,
Further still to the West between Scicli and Licata, with the vital airfield at Gela in the
middle, were Divisions of the US 7th Army and US 11 Corps . They were to land on three beaches "Cent,"
"Dime" and "Joss" with a division allotted to each plus an armoured brigade for "Joss." The
remainder of the Armoured Division to which it belonged was kept afloat as a reserve. The American Operation was under the
command of Lieutenant-General Patton and Vice-Admiral Hewitt.
In addition a number of special operations were in place. The first was No 3 Commando and the
South African Squadron of the SAS to the extreme right near Syracuse. The second involved Nos 40 and 41 Royal Marine
Commando, under Laycock, to the left of the Canadians near Pachino. The third was a number of airborne landings, both British
and American, to speed up the capture of airfields.
There were potential conflicts of interest between the services in the timing of the operation. On the
one hand the parachutists needed bright moonlight conditions but the thousands of ships lying off shore felt vulnerable to air attack in such
conditions. However since the Allies now had air superiority the matter was resolved in favour of the parachutists.
An Allied deception plan convinced the Germans that Greece or Sardinia were the most likely targets for
the invasion and the CIC
of the Luftflotte 2 concentrated his resources to the defence of the latter.
and Lampedusa had surrendered in mid June after sustained and heavy aerial bombing by the Allies and the bombing of Sicilian Airfields, in the 7 days
prior to Husky, had been so successful that not a single Axis plane put out to harass convoys approaching Sicily.
In the afternoon of D-1 an unseasonable force 7 north-westerly gale blew up and the smaller craft were
tossed about like corks. On D Day itself the Canadians and Americans landed in very rough conditions suffering the double discomfort of
seasickness and a drenching through to the skin. The British conditions on the leeward side of the island were better as the landing craft moved
inshore. However these unfavourable conditions had a beneficial side effect - the enemy relaxed their guard in the mistaken belief that a
landing in such conditions was most unlikely and initial resistance was consequently less than expected.
The high winds caused problems in the air too. British and American troops were flown from Kairouan in
Tunisia in some 400 transport aircraft and 137 gliders. The planes taking part in a British glider-borne landing
and an American parachute drop were badly scattered. Poor flying and navigational conditions, combined with inadequately trained pilots, were the
main contributory factors. Only a fraction of the elite troops reached their targets but sufficient to complete their tasks. Of the gliders in the British sector about a dozen were released early and lost in the sea. There were many casualties. Around D + 3 a number
of Allied supply aircraft were shot down by friendly fire as they strayed over the area of activity. Whatever the reason for the aircraft being
off course a failure in aircraft recognition was the primary cause of the losses.
There was also concern over the disappearance of 9 of the 13 officers and ratings sent ashore in advance
of the operation to reconnoitre the beaches. The task of these Combined Operations Pilotage Parties (COPPs) was to provide vital information
about conditions but not without risk to the element of surprise - if discovered by the enemy their presence would give advance warning of an impending operation. However Sicily was an obvious target
and feints had been set up in the Balkans and in attaching Greek interpreters to battalions. This and other deceptions gave the Allies the
surprise the needed. When the scale of the invasion of Sicily became
clear to Hitler he immediately cancelled a planned offensive at Kursk on the Russian front, and ordered the transfer of troops to the defence of
Below is a diary of events in support of the British Eighth Army
by an unknown author kindly provided by Howard Wallace-Sims whose father served
in Combined Operations in WW2.
Fri 9th July
Stand by call to action stations.
Sat 10th July
02.25 All's well. Flashes of AA fire from the beach. Beach well in sight,
cruisers and destroyers steaming on starboard beam.
02.35 All's well. Beach lit up by star shells. AA fire. Waiting to go in.
First wave of RM Commandos in LCG3 believed gone in.
02.45 Our wave ready to go in, LCGs 9 & 10 with Canadians. LCG3 just going in.
RAF still carrying out softening process.
03.00 No action as yet. Bombing and AA fire still active.
03.15 Moving into beach on port side. Aís and Mís loaded with RM Commandos
disappear in darkness towards beach.
03.30 Standing by to fire. Steady bombing still in progress. Range approx. 2
Ĺ miles, 4000 yards.
03.45 Still moving in, covering port side of landing.
04.00 No shelling as yet. Intensified bombing still in progress. Range
approx. 4000 yards.
04.25 All guns loaded with reduced charges. Exchange of fire between MLs and
machine gun posts. Still closing with beach. Range 3500 yards.
04.30 Prepare to fore on machine gun posts from which tracers are pouring.
Range 1000 yards. Dawn is now breaking. Troops still pouring in.
04.35 Manoeuvring for covering fire and bombardment. No sign of any action
against ships yet.
04.40 Heavy smoke screen covering island. No shots fired at us as yet.
Rocket ships fired salvos and cleared machine gun posts.
04.45 Dawn has broken. Everything is clear. Destroyer fires two salvos and
then withdraws. Battery opens up at us. A large number of ships on the
horizon. Still training guns on target but still no shelling. Shots straddle
ship and make it shake. Enemy shore batteries firing at LCGs.
04.55 Begin firing in reply to enemy guns. Enemy guns silenced. Bridge
reports ammunition dump hit. Clear daylight, action well under way.
Expecting next shot to hit us. LCG firing closer to beach. LCAs standing off
beach. Troops pouring in. Shelling growing strong.
05.20 LCG 9ís gunfire effective.
05.30 Not much reply from the enemy, must be engaged by troops. Odd shots
dropping by craft. Many of our planes visible. Enemy battery silenced by us.
Complimented by craft coming alongside. Fires starting on shore, landing
craft standing off. Troops pouring in Ė 8th Army.
05.40 Resistance not heavy, it appears that aircraft supported overhead.
Pongos being ferried ashore. Shelling still continued, enemy guns silenced.
05.50 No important developments. Tanks, troops and amphibians still
streaming ashore. Bursts of Bren fire on shore.
07.45 Town appears to be taken. Fighting continues but not very heavy.
Machine gun fire coming from hills. Large explosion in water, just off
08.00 No further developments. Expecting enemy naval forces. We are now
lying 800 yards of landing beach, 200 yards off rocky point. Water is only
25 feet deep, too shallow for LCIs to beach. Troops being taken ashore in
LCAs. Just said hello to some pals in an LCA passing on the starboard
quarter. Itís a small world. 51st Division still pouring in. More
troop ships than that standing by, out to sea. Monitors and Destroyers which
took part in shelling from further out, standing by, also awaiting orders
09.00 We are now at a large bay at east tip of island. The town is on our
port beam, and on port bow large fires with dense smoke have started. The
landing beach is sandy, merging into fertile countryside, with flat hill in
the distance. Artillery landed sometime before, and are now engaging enemy
positions. Circling aircraft are keeping a stout vigil.
09.30 Heavy explosions now occurring regularly on shore. Hands to cruising
10.45 Bombardment by 6" cruiser and destroyer. Enemy resistance on land.
Aircraft bomb positions. AA fire returned. Ten minutes bombardment.
Amphibians moving in to land. Tanks visible on beach. LCIs still unloading
troops. Other landings reported successful.
15.00 Aerodrome captured. Shelling not required.
15.45 Enemy being shelled in town by 15" monitor. Range accurate. Fall of
16.00 Rumble of gunfire on ridge from top of island. Heavy fighting
continues. Casualties unknown.
19.55 Bombardment by 6" cruiser to assist our troops.
21.30 Sing song in progress on B gun deck. Ammunition issued to all Marines.
21.45 Moving out of bay to edge of convoy to watch for mines and E boats.
22.00 Air attacks commencing. The sky is lit up like Blackpool
illuminations. Dive bombers attempting to destroy troopships.
22.30 A stick of bombs has just fallen 50 yards astern and ahead, and two to
port and two to starboard.
22.45 A large bomb has just dropped on starboard quarter. Bombing is getting
more accurate. Two minor casualties. The Marine Officer has been grazed on
the leg and Yorky was struck in the stomach with a small piece of shrapnel.
23.15 No ship appear to have been hit. Smoke clearing away. Two LCIs are
alongside, and cannot reach their parent ship.
Sun 11th July
01.00 Shelling by 15" Monitor. Flares on beach.
05.35 Firing with rifles at believed enemy mines and suspicious objects.
Enemy opposition on shore against tanks serious. RM Commandos did splendid
job. Silenced machine gun posts and captured 1,000 Italians.
08.00 Bright sunshine. General clean up of ships. Standing by for further
Syracuse fell on July 10 and Augusta on the 13th to the advancing British 8th Army with the XII Corp
advancing on Catania. On July 13 the leading troops were held up by an enemy rearguard at Lentini. To speed up the advance, landings were made to
capture the bridges to the north of the town. No 3 Commando landed at Agnone and prevented the destruction of the Ponte del Malati while the 1st
Parachute Brigade and 151 Brigade captured the Primasole Bridge over the Simeto giving the British forces a route to the plain of Catania. These
gains were made at considerable cost because of resistance from the Hermann Goring Division. Firmly established on the slopes of Mount Etna the
Germans held up the British advance. The plain with the Gerbini airfields was in dispute for almost three weeks.
The only serious opposition encountered by the Americans was at Gela when the 1st US Division and a tank battalion were,
after an unimpeded landing, met with a counter attack by German troops and armour. By D + 2 the invaders were back on the beaches. At one stage
German tanks broke through the bridgehead but were engaged by the cruiser Savannah and the destroyer Shubrick.
Order was restored as the 30 six inch guns bore down on the Germans from point
blank range. This temporary German success was attributed in part to delays
the swell but also to General Patton's eagerness to push inland before the
required supporting arms were in place. The troops soon came up against the
formidable 15th Panzer Division in full array. Without the naval intervention
there was a serious risk of the US forces being pushed back into the sea. Patton
himself was obliged to move back on board Hewitt's HQ ship. Later Mountbatten,
in all innocence, enquired by loud hailer from his destroyer to Hewitt "How far
has General Patton got?" Hewitt replied "He has not! The General is back on
board this ship." History does not record Patton's words when he and Mountbatten
met shortly afterwards.
The Canadians near Pachino had at their disposal the newly introduced Landing Craft Gun (LCG). One lucky
round blew up an ammunition dump but more generally the effectiveness of the weapon would have been improved had radio communications between the
advancing troops and the LCGs been better. Six Landing Craft Tanks (Rocket) were in support of the Highland Division and they performed superbly
under the command of Lieut-Commander Hugh Mulleneux. Each of the 2,500 rockets fired as the "Jocks" approached the beaches delivered a
punch 25% greater than that delivered by a 6-inch shell. The Highland Division got ashore with only a handful of casualties.
On July 22 the Americans under General Patton entered Palermo but by the end of July their advance was
slowing down as they approached Mount Etna. However German resistance at Adrano was overcome on Aug 6 by the British 78th Division and with the capture
of Randazzo on the 13th by US forces the German position was no longer viable. (Maps Courtesy of Bison Books Ltd).
The beach organisation was better than 'Torch' but there were still problems caused mainly by human
frailties. One example was the misuse of the miraculous DUKW - a 2.5 ton American amphibious lorry. Many were driven ashore with troops on board
and then continued inland to deliver their cargo close to the front line. The congestion in the narrow Sicilian streets and roads was a sight to
behold at a time when the movement of supplies and weapons was a priority. One DUKW was loaded with 10 tons of ammunition when the limit was a
quarter of this. To the considerable consternation of the driver his DUKW disappeared below the waves on reaching the bottom of the ramp!
Improved waterproofing of vehicles and recovery measures for stranded or broken down craft reduced
losses to as little as 1.5% on the British beaches. On the more exposed western beaches losses were around 12%. It was found that the small
harbour of Licata had a greater ship handling capacity than envisaged and this relieved pressure on supplies and communications as well as
reducing dependence on Syracuse and Augusta.
Human frailty was a problem in the key area of the management and control of men and materials onto and
off the beaches. This unenviable and arduous job was that of Beachmaster. There were abuses in the deployment of men and materials. One
divisional commander re-deployed men engaged on shifting supplies. Within 12 hours they were on the front line. He later complained about the
delay in supplies reaching the front lines! Pilfering was rife. Too many senior officers who should have known better regarded the Beach Groups
as a "God-sent pool of everything." Later reports from different sources criticised this phase of the operation;
"Beachmasters and assistant beachmasters should be men of personality, experience and
adequate seniority, capable of exercising complete control in the dark." (McGrigor)
"Naval Beachmasters should be preferably bad tempered, and certainly dictatorial by
"The Brick (Beach) Commander must be King of the Brick (Beach) area" (Maund)
"Some of the American Beachmasters are too junior and too polite to Generals."
(General Wedemeyer of Eisenhower's staff)
The American's had a standard operating procedure (SOP) for the landing of men and materials. This
involved loading in the same ship all the men and materials for the first battalion ashore. No one ship could carry all the landing craft needed
so others were drafted in from nearby ships. This arrangement required a high degree of training and complete immunity from enemy interference.
Potentially as landing craft moved around in the dark going from one vessel to another some might get lost and others delayed. Henriques put his
concerns to Patton who seriously considered adopting the British technique but decided that it was too near the operational date to make
last-minute changes. In the event thorough rehearsals by the Americans and the lack of opposition from the enemy enabled the system to work.
The British men and equipment for each phase of the landings were distributed amongst a number of ships
in such a manner that only their own landing craft were needed to transport the troops and equipment onboard to the beaches. Under
these arrangements there was no need to use landing craft from other ships thus avoiding the inherent difficulties mentioned earlier. Truscott's
landings using the British method were particularly successful. Principles for amphibious landings honed and developed over years of Combined
Operations experience were put into practice. Henriques attributed his success to;
speed coupled with a due allowance of time for the beach group to develop the beaches
surprise in that a substantial proportion of infantry were ordered to by pass resistance and
effect, with utmost speed, a deep penetration into the high ground that commanded the prospective bridgehead and its
the mobilisation and concentration of every possible means of fire support for the initial
the provision of specially equipped and specially trained assault troops prepared to fight in
the organisation in which they disembarked,
the sacrifice of normal military organisation to this end,
the retention of a very powerful floating reserve,
adequate and carefully planned rehearsal with a due allowance of time for correction of
planning in minute detail with the resultant feeling of confident elasticity.
Henriques was also very impressed with US Navy crews. "Their coolness and discipline were quite
outstanding and could never be forgotten by any of the soldiers taking part in the operation."
Other lessons were learned from the Americans. Whereas the British basic unit of the beach group was an
infantry battalion the Americans had an Engineer Shore Unit with a high proportion of technically qualified men. Such skills were invaluable in
quickly resolving unforeseen problems in the area of the beachhead. In addition the Americans had an efficient and effective method of loading
store ships with groups of stores secured together for loading into DUKWs for dispatch to the shore.
Husky was a great triumph and Mountbatten could not disguise his delight at the important part Combined
Operations had played in the operation. For his part Hewitt's report included 178 recommendations and ended with the warmest praise for the
co-operation and comradeship between the Royal Navy and that of the USA. He recalled that it was only barely 14 months since he had visited
Admiral King's office in Washington. They and their respective teams had shared much in the planning of the operation and the rewards were there
for all to see.
"I accompanied Admiral Ramsay on board the Antwerp on D minus 1, and saw all the convoys as they
passed on their way to their rendezvous south of Malta. I have been 27 years at sea and I have never seen a sight like it in my life. It was like
the Spithead Review multiplied by twenty. There were just forests of masts in every direction, as far as the eye could see. It was the most
imposing and inspiring site, and all troops and sailors had their tails so obviously vertical that when you went anywhere near them they broke
Summary of Action
Allied Forces: Air - varied;
Sea - varied; Land - British 8th Army under Montgomery, US 7th Army under General Patton
Axis Forces: Air - Varied units of
German and Italian Air forces. Sea - Varied units of German and Italian navies. Land -
Two German Divisions (later reinforced by Eastern front troops) and Ten Italian Divisions.
Outcome (positive): Allied victory. With the capture of Sicily the Allies made ready for the
invasion of Italy. 37,000 German and 130,000 Italian losses mostly prisoners. Gain of naval and air bases in the Mediterranean.
Outcome (negative): 31,158 killed, wounded or missing.
There are over 200 books
listed on our 'Combined Operations Books' page which can be purchased on-line
from the Advanced Book Exchange (ABE) whose search banner checks the shelves of
thousands of book shops world-wide. Type in or copy and paste the title of your
choice or use the 'keyword' box for book suggestions. There's no obligation to
buy, no registration and no passwords. Click
'Books' for more information.
Italian Star Veterans 1943 - 1944 website and
memorial appeal. Click here.
Sicily Landing Siracusa - Impavidus Cultural Association. As
president of the Association I would like to invite your readers to visit
our website to find out about our
Association. Veterans of the landings, who would like to join us, are
particularly welcome - there is a page on the website to register your interest.
For further information contact
Commandos and Rangers of World War 2
by James D. Ladd. Pub. 1978 by MacDonald & Jane's. 0 356 08432 9
Commandos 1940 - 1946 by Charles
Messenger. Pub. by William Kimber, London 1985. 0 7183 0553 1
Commando by Dunford-Slater. Pub. by Kimber 1953 - from the pen of one of the major players.
The Watery Maze by Bernard
Fergusson pub. 1961 by Collins.
us know if you have any information or book
recommendations to add to this page.
This account of Operation Husky, the invasion of
Sicily, was compiled from information
contained in the following books; Commandos 1940 - 1946 by Charles
Messenger. Pub. by William Kimber, London 1985. 0 7183 0553 1, Commando by Dunford-Slater. Pub. by Kimber 1953 - from the pen of one of the major players. The Watery Maze by Bernard
Fergusson pub. 1961 by Collins.