|
| ||||||||||||||||||||||
- HDML 1301 - OPERATION BRASSARD - 17 JUN 1944 - by David Carter
This account of the role of Harbour Defence Motor Launch 1301 in Operation Brassard will be of greatest interest to researchers or those with a special interest in the subject. It provides a valuable insight into the complex and detailed planning which preceded all raids and landings. It was prepared by David Carter whose father, Lt F L Carter, RNVR was killed in the action. The author, together with Dutch Commandos, was recently involved in the recovery of his father's vessel HDML 1301 from the Mediterranean to Holland. Plans are in place to restore it to its 1943 appearance. Unless otherwise stated sources of information include Admiralty records in the National Archive augmented with notes taken from letters sent home by Lt Carter. In reading this account please bear in mind that the two HDMLs led this attack several hours ahead of the main group, with their cargo of commandos. [Photos courtesy of David Carter . Photos taken by Lt Carter (RNVR)].
- Background - The Harbour Defence Motor Launch (HDML) was designed by W J Holt at the Admiralty in early 1939. During World War II 486 HDMLs were built mainly by yacht builders in the United Kingdom and a number of other allied countries. [Photo - ML1301 in Mousehole, Cornwall] HDMLs were originally intended for the defence of estuarial and local waters. They proved to be such a sea-kindly and versatile design that they were used in every theatre of operation as the war progressed. They were to be found escorting convoys off the West Coast of Africa, carrying out covert activities in the Mediterranean and undertaking anti-submarine patrols off Iceland. [from "Medusa" by Mike Boyce]. HDML 1301 was laid down in the yard of W Blackmore in Bideford, Devon in September 1942. She was launched in January 1943, completed in Appledore and commissioned in April 1943. She was under the command of Lt F L Carter RNVR who oversaw construction and was able to stipulate minor variations to the basic design such as armour cladding to the bridge.
Her armament, initially, consisted of a 2 pounder gun on the foredeck, a 20 mm Orlikon on the stern cabin, a .303 Vickers machine on each side of the bridge and eight depth charges on racks at the stern. After working-up in the Bristol Channel HDML 1301 was grouped into a convoy in Milford Haven, and sailed for Malta via Gibraltar. In Malta the 2 pounder gun was removed and replaced by second 20 mm Orlikon. From Malta, HDML1301 took part in Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily, and later the invasion of Italy at Salerno after which she was based in Naples. [Photo - HDML 1301 in Malta for fitting of Orlikon guns]. In late 1943, the Navy reorganised the Coastal Forces in Italy as follows. Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Central Mediterranean SOIS to operate all surface light forces in this area against enemy supply lines (under direction of FOWIT) and act as C in C’s representative in Corsica for the purpose of co-operation with French Naval Command in Corsica. The Naval Officer in Charge Maddalena to command all Allied Naval Forces in Sardinia (under FOWIT). This duty to be carried out by the Captain in charge of the 10th Submarine Flotilla (Captain Dickinson appointed to this post 2/11/1943) and responsible to C in C for the operation of submarines in the western basin of the Mediterranean, notwithstanding his responsibility to FOWIT for the Naval Base at Maddalena. The officer in command of all the sub-areas in the Central Mediterranean to organise local convoy movements and operate local forces under their command in accordance with the general instructions of the C in C. By early 1944, HDML 1301 operated from Maddalena. Boats re-fueled there since the facilities at Bastia were unusable due to the presence of ships sunk by the retreating enemy. [ADM/199/2424] 490 men from the Battalion de Choc and 70 from Groupe de Commando will be landed 3 hours before H-hour. They will be carried in LCI (L)s and MLs of Group 2 and 9and LCAs of 577 Flotilla to Louise Green (Beach). HDML 1301 is to take station 200 yards, 335o from LC (H) 315 ready for LCAs to form up. He is to show a steady red light towards the group. Craft are to be manned and formed up as quickly as possible in accordance with the diagram below. Lt P W Spencer will be embarked on LCI (L) 303 with the Commander of Battalion de Choc and is to transfer to HDML 1301 as LCAs are forming up. At H–2.45hrs HDML1301 is to lead off to position 211, Marina di Capo light 25.5 cables, marked by PT 211 who will flash Z’s. HDML 1301 is to pass him at H–2.10hrs and steer to arrive at the inner release position 236, Marina di Capo light 21.5 cables at H–1.95hrs. This course is in line with Mt Caponne, the highest point on the island. Should the PT be off station, he will flash the true course to inner release position when he sights the formation. The Folboat in position 248, Marina di Capo light 17.2 cables, will be flashing L’s to seaward from H–2.25hrs until passed by the LCAs. Don’t worry if the light not sighted – the light may not have made it. As soon as the HDML 1301 stops, the Flotilla Officer is to reduce speed and turn his flotilla to starboard and make straight for the beach. His course should take him past the Folboat towards the lowest part of the skyline. He should approach to within 300 yards of the beach before taking his column in to touch down at H–1.80hrs followed in turn by the two remaining columns as soon as the beech is clear.
The beach is about 100 yards long, to its rear is a terraced slope between two hills. If you cannot find the beach, go to Louise Red. On clearing the beech craft are to return to HDML 1301 at slow speed, on no account rev up engines unless fired on by enemy. Form up in original order except both LCS (M) on starboard side ready to return to waiting area. When Lt Spencer in HDML 1301 has collected his group, he is to steer at slow speed to waiting area C for 10 minutes. After this, he is to check compasses with Flotilla Officer. [Photo - an HDML on patrol in the Mediterranean]. During the Main Assault Lt Spencer in HDML1301 will wait at (R). When the group arrives, he is to take up a position 100 yards east of LST 4. LCV (P) are to form up as follows: As each LST completes loading her 5 craft, they are to form up and close HDML 1301 which will be stationed 100 yards east of LST4. At H–85, HDML 1301 will lead off to join up astern of main assault flight which will be marked by HDML 1246 showing a red light toward convoy. Assault on Kodak Green Beach. On reaching position 093o Marina di Capo light 10 cables, HDML 1301 is to lead the 14 LCV(P) round to starboard until heading for the beach, when he is to stop. LCV(P) Flotilla Officer is to proceed on in and to touch down in two waves, first at H–10. Both waves must beach on either side of the rock in the centre, the fist wave clearing outwards to allow the second to come in. On clearing the beach, LCV (P) are to rejoin HDML1301 who is to lead them out in line ahead on a reciprocal course keeping as close to the coast as possible. Major LCs will be entering at some time but it is the responsibility of the minor LCs to keep out of their way. HDML1301 will lead them back to (R) proceeding on a track ½ mile east of approach course. Lt Spencer in HDML 1301 is to proceed at full speed to (T) as soon as LCV(P) have found parent LSTs. On arrival he is to take up position as "Return Convoy Controller" where he will be joined by LCI(L)316 and transfer to it.
F-lighters are used for actual conveyance of stores in convoy and for protection. Some have been armed with 1, 2 or even 3 88 mm guns with 2 or possibly 3 quadruple 20 mm mountings. They may also have concrete or armour protection to their sides. It is reported that some of these specially armed craft have been given the task of protecting harbours of Elba. 3 F-lighters have been seen in Kodak section at one time. These craft have been seen in the lettered position shown opposite. (Around Marina di Campo). It is possible that they may be in Kodak Sector during the assault. Reconnaissance at last light on D – 1 will be made to confirm their positions, if present, and the results signalled using these lettered positions. Details of F-lighters: Length: 154 feet, Beam: 21 feet, Height of upper deck amidships: 10 feet. Armament mounted on centre line with base plates of guns slightly below upper deck level. Each 88 mm gun is probably in a circular gun shield. The humped continuous upper deck, characteristic bow and narrow beam should serve to distinguish these craft from our own LCTs and LCGs. [Planning File ADM/199/2425 Copied from Orders issued by Senior Naval Officer (Landing) P1 Naval Party 893 on 11 June 1944]. The first enemy throughout the Mediterranean campaign was the German F-lighter, an ingenious multi-purpose vessel with very shallow draft which could be used in the role of freighter, troop-carrier or flak ship according to need, or the three roles simultaneously. In its most offensive role it boasted a firepower which no MTB or MGB could hope to match: an 88mm dual-purpose gun, a 40 mm and multiple 37 mm and 30 mm and bristling machine guns. Because of their shallow draft they were very difficult to torpedo, and for a while the only method of attack was to get in so close under cover of darkness that their guns could not be sufficiently depressed to make a hit. Copied from [The Longest Battle – The War of the Boats]. The assault on Elba differed from any previous one carried out by the force. Owing to the danger of mines it was considered inadvisable to use LSI, LST and major landing craft, and MLs, therefore, had the dual task of transporting the assaulting forces and towing the minor landing craft from the advanced base to the release position. In fact we were presented with the problems of a Short Range Assault. As we expected, the French military staff were completely ignorant of the science of combined operations. Unfortunately in many cases they seemed loath to accept facts given by us and considerable delay ensued. There was no vehicular training through a watersplash, due to the lack of waterproofing material, but the French were not unduly worried by this. As a result several vehicles stalled when disembarking. Reputedly the best performance of driving was by French lady ambulance drivers. Finally I wish to state my personal admiration for the way in which all naval personnel under my orders carried out their duties. There was a noticeable spirit of determination throughout the force which has been commented on from outside sources. [ADM/199/2425. Captain Errol Turner, LC(H) 315 9 July 1944].
On the South Coast one or two F-Lighters thought to have been evacuating Pianosa Garrison, possibly accompanied by an E-boat were sighted at 0030 by the PT boats. … Short engagement, both PT boats damaged, one man killed. One of the F-Lighters then encountered ML1301 which had just released the 9 MCAs making the most westerly landing. ML1301 came under heavy cannon and machine-gun fore to which she replied. The Captain was killed, First Lt and 5 ratings injured. F-Lighter then passed into Golfo di Campo without sighting the landing craft. The F-Lighter appears to have rounded Elba to the west after encounter with PT Boats. [Operations Brassard LC (H) 315]. During all this time ML 1301 and her 9 LCAs and 2 LCS (M) for Louise Green were not having such an easy time. They led off from position (R) at 2350 hours and the approach to this dispersal point was not entirely to plan. The only exception was PT 211 who was well over to eastward but as the details of the land were clearly visible this caused no difficulty. The Folboat was in the correct position. At 0055 ML 1301 was lying pointing roughly North-West having released the LCAs at 0040 in position 9 cables 198o centre of Louise Green, when a vessel was sighted off the Port Bow steaming South-East about 2 cables distant. It looked like an F-Lighter and this was confirmed a second or two later when German voices were heard. Guns were trained on the enemy but it was hoped they would not see us. The enemy opened fire about 10 seconds after we first sighted him with intense 20mm and machine gun fire. At the same time, fire was returned and many of the ship’s company reported hearing screams as Orlikon bursts found their marks. The enemy disengaged and when last seen was steaming for Golfo di Campo. At 0105 hours, course was set for position (R) as I considered it paramount import to report presence of the enemy and secure medical assistance. [Lt Spencer - Operation Brassard LC (H) 315 - Landing of the Battalion de Choc.].
It has now been established that the enemy never sighted the LCAs and did not realise the Island was being invaded until 0347 hours when the alarm was given. Just after the Squadron Officer had left, ML 1301 arrived alongside. Lt Spencer gave us the full story and reported that the CO was dead, the First Lt and 4 seamen wounded. Miraculously no major damage sustained by hull or engines. All casualties were transformed to LC (H) 315 and Sub Lt Rossiter, one of SNO (L)’s staff and one signalman lent to him. ML 1301 then proceeded to the LST to gather up the 14 LCV (P)s he was to lead to Kodak Green Beach. 17 June 0001 hours: Sighted PT 211 flashing Zs, but too far to Starboard. In view of visibility and correct departure, it was not considered necessary to break RT silence to inform ML 1301 who must have realised PT 211was out of position. 0027 hours: Spasmodic machine gun fire bearing 280o,estimated distance 7 miles. Nothing on Radar. From later reports this appears to have been 2 PTs who were fired on by F-Lighter on way to Campo Bay. 0035 hours: Exchange of Orlikon fire bearing 355o off Louise Green. Continued intermittently for about a minute (this proved to be ML 1301 and F-Lighter). 0103 hours: Received signal that Shock Troops had landed successfully on Louise Green. No time. Received signal from ML 1301 that there was an F-Lighter off Campo Head. 0210 hours: ML 1301 came alongside and reported they had been fired on by F-Lighter which disengaged and moved into Campo Bay. Six casualties removed from ML, including CO killed, First Lt wounded. Lt Spencer took command and Sub-Lt Rossiter lent to him as First Lt. 0227 hours: LCAs and LCS (M) returned from Louise Green Beach. Reported no casualties or damage, although fire from F-Lighter fell near Folboat and beach, no one touched. 0235 hours: Signal sent to Senior Officer N that in view of known presence of F-Lighter in Campo Bay, that LCGs be sent to deal with them; it being considered that all form of surprise was lost. 0250 hours: Main assault group formed up and moved off. 24 June 1944. The first landings 3 hours before H Hour went to plan. The westernmost landing consisting of 200 shock troops destined for Poro battery overlooking Campo Bay had just been released to go inshore when the F-Lighter returning to Campo with the Pianosa Garrison blundered into the ML which had led the attack and was waiting offshore to collect the returning boats. In the brief exchange of shots the Captain of the ML was killed, others wounded but the boat unhurt. The F-Lighter then went into Campo, discharged his cargo and three wounded, then turned in for the night. They had no suspicion that an assault was impending. 26 June 0855 hours: Sub Lt Rossiter rejoined staff. Lt Peter William Spencer, awarded DSO 6 September 1944. During the landing on the South Coast of Elba, Lt Peter William Spencer in HDML 1301 was responsible for finding Louise Green Beach and for landing 9 LCA carrying the French Battalion de Choc at 0100 on 17 June 1944. After releasing the craft for the last position of their run in, HDML 1301 was attacked by a German F-Lighter. In the action which followed, the Commanding Officer of HDML1301 was killed and the First Lt wounded. Lt Spencer took charge and brought the HDML back to SNO(L) in LC(H) 315, 4miles from the beach in time to lead in the US landing craft in the main assault on Kodak Green Beach at 0400. This officer displayed outstanding gallantry, initiative and determination of purpose. [Errol C L Turner, Captain RN, CO]. This recommendation is strongly concurred in. The successful manner in which the US landing craft were manoeuvred and brought in for the assault under heavy fire after the damage and casualties sustained by HDML 1301 in her encounter with the enemy 3 hours previously, was a splendid example of resolution and fighting spirit. [Rear Admiral Trowbridge]. I concur. C F Stanton-Colville, President, Award Committee I concur. Admiral Cunningham, Admiral C-in-C Mediterranean. Alan John Godfrey, Temporary Sub-Lt RNVR, awarded Mention in Dispatches. At about 0100 on 17 June 1944, HDML 1301 in which he was First Lt., had a close engagement with a German F-Lighter off the coast of Elba. He was wounded many times by shrapnel in the chest and back, and in spite of this he went aft to superintend the making of smoke. By doing so, he set a fine example to those around him, many of whom were wounded. [Errol C L Turner, Captain RN, CO]. I concur Rear Admiral Trowbridge I concur. C F Stanton-Colville, President, Award Committee I concur. Admiral Cunningham, Admiral C-in-C Mediterranean. Harry Donald Davies, Commanding Officer ML 1246 and Squadron Officer awarded Mention in Dispatches Under heavy fire, found alternative landing place, provided smoke, reconnoitred inner beaches despite heavy fire. Displayed courage of highest order, efficiency, complete disregard for enemy
This Website - Royal Naval Commandos, Operation Brassard. The Coastal Forces Heritage Trust
Beachhead Assault by David Lee. The Story of the Royal Naval
Commandos in WW2. Foreword by Tony Parsons. Published By Greenhill Books
in October 2004.
The Beachhead Commandos by a Cecil Hampshire. Published by William Kimber & Co Ltd in 1983.
|
|
Screen resolutions of 800 x 600 and 1024 x 768 are best. Copyright © 2001 to 2008 inclusive [Combinedops.com]. All rights reserved. |